In James O'Shea Eric Rubenstein (ed.), Self, Language, and World:Problems from Kant, Sellars, and Rosenberg. Ridgeview Publishing Co. pp. 61-88 (2010)

Authors
Douglas C. Long
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
Abstract
I defend the thesis that psychological states can be literally ascribed only to living creatures and not to nonliving machines, such as sophisticated robots. Defenders of machine consciousness do not sufficiently appreciate the importance of the biological nature of a subject for the psychological significance of its behavior. Simulations of a computer-controlled, nonliving autonomous robot cannot carry the same psychological meaning as animate behavior. Being a living creature is an essential link between genuinely expressive behavior and justified psychological ascriptions.
Keywords minds,  animate behavior,   consciousness  robot  Thinking machines  HAL  artificial intelligence  action
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Upload history
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Why Machines Can Neither Think nor Feel.Douglas C. Long - 1994 - In Dale W. Jamieson (ed.), Language, Mind and Art. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Robots, Consciousness and Programmed Behaviour.Keith Gunderson - 1968 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 19 (August):109-22.
The Feelings of Robots.Paul Ziff - 1958 - Analysis 19 (January):64-68.
Minds, Machines, and Money: What Really Explains Behavior.Fred Dretske - 1998 - In J. A. M. Bransen & S. E. Cuypers (eds.), Human Action, Deliberation and Causation. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 157--173.
The Unity of Consciousness: An Enactivist Approach.Ralph D. Ellis & Natika Newton - 2005 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 26 (4):225-280.
Robots with Consciousness: Creating a Third Nature.Bernhard J. Mitterauer - 2013 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 5 (2):179-193.
What's in a Mind?Zenon W. Pylyshyn - 1987 - Synthese 70 (January):97-122.
On the Moral Responsibility of Military Robots.Thomas Hellström - 2013 - Ethics and Information Technology 15 (2):99-107.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2014-11-25

Total views
214 ( #37,885 of 2,329,874 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
21 ( #29,552 of 2,329,874 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes