Trichotomizing the Standard Twofold Model of Thomistic Eudaimonism: A Solution to a Logical Problem

American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 86 (1):23-46 (2012)
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Abstract

Aquinas’s eudaimonism is normally interpreted as twofold in that it divides into the imperfect natural happiness of Aristotle and the perfect supernatural happiness of Augustine. I argue that Aquinas is logically committed to a third type of happiness that, in light of the standard view, renders his eudaimonism threefold. The paper begins with an overview of the standard twofold model of Aquinas’s eudaimonism; it then turns to the model’s logical problem whose solution requires the postulation of a third type of happiness. In the second part of the paper, two clarificatory issues are addressed and several objections are considered. In closing, I explain why Aquinas’s commitment to a third type of happiness offers the Christian wayfarer grounds for a new optimism.

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