Medieval Ethics

Moral philosophers and theologians have long debated the classic moral dilemma of lying to an intruder in order to save a refugee. This dilemma presents an especially difficult challenge to those who reject consequentialist reasoning. Many contemporary defenders of Thomas Aquinas have argued that lying is never permissible under any circumstances, but none has offered a satisfactory answer to the question of what one ought to do when facing such a dilemma. I argue that there can be no morally satisfying (...) answer to this question, because every possible action will involve some degree of sin, even if lying is the least sinful action. This should not lead us to redefine what it means to tell a lie, nor to say that lying to the intruder is a good or right action; rather, it should lead us to acknowledge the tragic dimension of life in a fallen world. (shrink)

One of the best-known principles of halakha is that Shabbat is violated to save a life. Who does this saving and how do we know that a life is in danger? What categories of illness violate Shabbat and who decides? A historical-sociological analysis of the roles played by Jew, non-Jew, and physician according to the approach of “medical cosmology” can help us understand the differences in the approach of the Shulchan Aruch compared to later decisors (e.g., the Mishnah Berurah). Such (...) differences illuminate how premodern medical triage coexisted with a different halakhic understanding than that of the biomedical age. (shrink)

In this chapter, we examine a few potential problems when inquiring into the ethics of medieval Christian and Islamic mystical traditions: First, there are terminological and methodological worries about defining mysticism and doing comparative philosophy in general. Second, assuming that the Divine represents the highest Good in such traditions, and given the apophaticism on the part of many mystics in both religions, there is a question of whether or not such traditions can provide a coherent theory of value. Finally, the (...) antinomian tendencies and emphasis on passivity of some mystics might lead one to wonder whether their prescriptive exhortations can constitute a coherent theory of right action. We tackle each of these concerns in turn and discuss how they might be addressed, in an attempt to show how medieval mysticism, as a fundamentally practical enterprise, deserves more attention from practical and moral philosophy than it has thus far received. (shrink)

Вихід у світ перекладу праці Марії Ґрації Бартоліні, відомої італійської славістки та дослідниці українських ранньомодерних текстів, не залишиться поза увагою тих, хто цікавиться історією вітчизняної культури, а тим більш її вивчає. На це є декілька причин. По-перше, ця праця є методологічно цілком новаторською на тлі величезного наукового та науково-популярного доробку, присвяченого творчості Григорія Сковороди. По-друге, авторка не лише декларує давно назрілу потребу «розсіяти стереотипи… про народний, несистематичний характер його рефлексії» (c. 5), а й успішно це здійснює. По-третє, джерела, на які (...) спиралася філософська візія Сковороди, у праці нарешті представлено не тільки на рівні концепцій, частина з яких була притаманною й іншим богословам та філософам (зазвичай, це викликає неабиякі складнощі при інтерпретації певних ідей, а також при спробах пов’язати їх із тими чи тими особами), а й на рівні лексичних запозичень, у збігах окремих фраз, у зіставленні спільних смислових чи семантичних полів, схожому способові мислення тощо. (shrink)

Both the function of one’s conscience, as Thomas Aquinas understands it, and the work of casuistry in general involve deliberating about which universal moral principles are applicable in particular cases. Thus, understanding how conscience can function better also indicates how casuistry might be done better – both on Thomistic terms, at least. I claim that, given Aquinas’ descriptions of certain parts of prudence and the role of moral virtue in practical knowledge, understanding particular cases more as narratives, or parts of (...) narratives, likely will result, all else being equal, in more accurate moral judgments of particular cases. This is especially important in two kinds of cases: first, cases in which Aquinas recognizes universal moral principles do not specify the means by which they are to be followed; second, cases in which the type-identity of an action – and thus the norms applicable to it – can be mistaken. (shrink)

This article analyzes the significance of the concepts “sovereignty” and “popular sovereignty” regarding the construction of modern law. Modern law isdefined in this study as a language of subjective rights (claim, liberty, power and immunity) and therefore has a nomological and authoritative character. The shift from low Middle-age to the beginning of Modernity seems to be the decisive period to understand the construction of modern law, due to the reception of Aristotle’s political writings and Roman law, aside from the rejection (...) of strong or thomist realism. In this sense, three works are analyzed: Marsilio of Padua “DefensorPacis”, William of Ockham “Breviloquium de Principatur Tyrannico” and Jean Bodin “Six Books of the Commonwealth”. The results seem to address that popular sovereignty as a foundation for legal language is in direct opposition to the acceptance of the strong concept of sovereignty, as stated by Bodin. (shrink)

Following the Second Vatican Council, the predominant trend in Catholic moral theology has been decidedly antagonistic toward the tradition that dominated moral theology before the Council, namely the use and formulation of ecclesiastically-approved “manuals” or “handbooks” of moral theology, the contents of which chiefly involved general precepts of morally good and bad behavior as well as the extension of those precepts to particular cases. In this paper, I will oppose the dominant anti-manual trend. More particularly, I will first sketch what (...) I take to be the central aspects of the manual tradition. Second, I will provide several arguments in favor of this tradition. Last, I will raise and respond to objections to this tradition that feature prominently in the works of Pinckaers and Cessario. (shrink)

Contemporary scholars routinely cast Aquinas’s imperfect happiness of this life as one of only acquired virtue, yet the Scholastics of the Late Renaissance all saw this happiness as one of acquired or infused virtue. This dispute goes unspoken today, as does the question it raises, namely, whether the infused virtues, rather than offer supernatural happiness only in the afterlife, offer it now even in this life. Further unsettled is why this question is even worth asking. I argue it is worth (...) asking for several reasons: historical, doctrinal, and methodological. The problem has implications for Aquinas’s reception of the Nicomachean Ethics. It also bears, on the one hand, on two of Aquinas's doctrines on twofold beatitude and, on the other hand, on Aquinas's teaching on the relationship of philosophy and theology. Moreover, an answer could lend support to the use of Late Scholastic commentary in the interpretation of Aquinas. I first defend the importance of our question, illustrating in turn its historical, doctrinal, and methodological value. I then give some direction for a balanced study of the problem. Finally, I clarify the status of our question and propose some ideas for further discussion. (shrink)

This paper discusses the views of three medieval thinkers—Anselm, Thomas Aquinas, and John Duns Scotus—about a specific aspect of the problem of evil, which can be dubbed ‘the Lucifer problem’. What was the object of the first evil choice? What could entice a perfectly rational agent placed in ideal circumstances into doing evil? Those thinkers agreed that Lucifer wanted to be happier, but while Anselm thought that that was something Lucifer could achieve by his natural powers, Aquinas held that it (...) was not naturally possible for Lucifer to be happier, even though it was something he could obtain supernaturally. By contrast, Scotus posited that what Lucifer wanted was beyond what was logically possible, i.e. to be as happy as God (or to be God’s equal). An interesting consequence of Scotus’s hypothesis is that God could have done nothing to make Lucifer’s evil choice less likely. (shrink)

This volume deals with contrasting developments in the period between 1400-1550.

The mystery of Aquinas's virtue ethics -- The gifts as second-personal dispositions -- Virtues and the second-person perspective -- The fruition of the virtues and gifts -- Conclusions and implications.

The volume contains 10 chapters on 5 main issues of philosophical ethics: Relative/Absolute, Natural/Normative, Value/Values, Reason/Passions, Commands/Counsels. Each issue is examined in two chapters, the first one dealing with ancient (or medieval) philosophical positions, and the second one dealing with modern or contemporary debates.

Introduction : what's the problem? -- The problem may lurk in Aristotle's ethics -- Aristotle's akratic : foreshadowing a solution -- A negligent omission at the root of all sinfulness : Anselm and the Devil -- Negligent vs. non-negligent : a Thomistic distinction directing us toward a solution -- Can I have your divided attention? : Scotus, indistinct intellections, and type-1 negligent omissions almost solved -- I can't get you out of my mind : Scotus, lingering indistinct intellections, and type-2 (...) negligent omissions -- Scotus's affection-ate corrective : a possible final solution to a type-2 variant -- Neglected treatises help solve negligence : the action theory of Francisco Suarez -- An answer that cannot be neglected : the solution -- Appendix A : translation of Nicomachean ethics 1146b31-1147b19. (shrink)

This publication deals with the practical philosophy in Barhebraeus's enclyclopaedia of Aristotelian wisdom "Butyrum sapientiae". The three Syriac books on Ethics, Politics and Economy are unique and the only specimens of its kind, surviving in the Syriac language and literature.

The eagerly-awaited second volume of The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts will allow scholars and students access for the first time in English to major texts in ethics and political thought from one of the most fruitful periods of speculation and analysis in the history of western thought. Beginning with Albert the Great, who introduced the Latin west to the challenging moral philosophy and natural science of Aristotle, and concluding with the first substantial presentation in English of the revolutionary (...) ideas on property and political power of John Wyclif, the seventeen texts in this anthology offer late medieval treatments of fundamental issues in human conduct that are both conceptually subtle and of direct practical import. Special features of this volume include copious editorial introductions, an analytical index, and suggestions for further reading. This is an important resource for scholars and students of medieval philosophy, history, political science, theology and literature. (shrink)