Climate denialism bullshit is harmful

Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):1-20 (2023)
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Abstract

This paper suggests that some climate denialism is bullshit. Those who spread it do not display a proper concern for the truth. This paper also shows that this bullshit is harmful in some significant ways. It undermines the epistemic demands imposed on us by what we care about, by the social roles we occupy, and by morality. It is also harmful because it corrodes epistemic trust.

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Joshua Luczak
University of Western Ontario

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References found in this work

Epistemic dependence.John Hardwig - 1985 - Journal of Philosophy 82 (7):335-349.
On bullshit.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1986 - Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
The role of trust in knowledge.John Hardwig - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (12):693-708.
What Is Epistemic Public Trust in Science?Gürol Irzık & Faik Kurtulmuş - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (4):1145-1166.

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