Davidson’s Objection to Horwich’s Minimalism about Truth

Journal of Philosophy 101 (8):429-437 (2004)
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Abstract

This paper shows how one can respond within truth-theoretic semantics, without appeal to parataxis, to Donald Davidson's objection to the intelligibility of Paul Horwich's statement of the minimalist position on truth.

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Kirk Ludwig
Indiana University, Bloomington

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References found in this work

On saying that.Donald Davidson - 1968 - Synthese 19 (1-2):130-146.
Semantics for opaque contexts.Kirk Ludwig & Greg Ray - 1998 - Philosophical Perspectives 12:141-66.

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