Rationality, Scientific Growth, and Large-Scale Systems of Belief

der 16. Weltkongress Für Philosophie 2:822-829 (1983)
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Abstract

The argument of this paper is that Kuhn's account of rational theory choice is too permissive and that an account that recognizes the large-scale nature of the system of scientific beliefs is more plausible and has more practical force.

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