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Andrew Lugg [92]Andrew Maxwell Lugg [1]Andrew M. Lugg [1]
  1. Deep Disagreement and Informal logic: No Cause for Alarm.Andrew Lugg - 1986 - Informal Logic 8 (1).
    An argument that the deepest disagreement can on occasion be resolved albeit over time.
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  2.  90
    The process of discovery.Andrew Lugg - 1985 - Philosophy of Science 52 (2):207-220.
    The main argument of this paper is that philosophical difficulties regarding scientific discovery arise mainly because philosophers base their arguments on a flawed picture of scientific research. Careful examination of N. R. Hanson's treatment of Kepler's discovery not only puts the rationality of this discovery beyond question, it also reveals what its rationality consists in. We can retrieve the point stressed by Hanson concerning the rational character of discoveries such as Kepler's even as we reject the type of "logical" analysis (...)
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  3. Bunkum, Flim‐Flam and Quackery: Pseudoscience as a Philosophical Problem.Andrew Lugg - 1987 - Dialectica 41 (3):221-230.
    In the first half of the paper, it is argued that while the prospects for a criterion for demarcating scientific theories from pseudoscientific ones are exceedingly dim, it is a mistake to fall back to the position that these differ only with regard to how well they are confirmed. One may admit that different pseudoscientific theories are flawed in different ways yet still insist that their flaws are structural rather than empirical in character. In the second half of the paper, (...)
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  4.  89
    Pierre Duhem's conception of natural classification.Andrew Lugg - 1990 - Synthese 83 (3):409 - 420.
    Duhem's discussion of physical theories as natural classifications is neither antithetical nor incidental to the main thrust of his philosophy of science. Contrary to what is often supposed, Duhem does not argue that theories are better thought of as economically organizing empirical laws than as providing information concerning the nature of the world. What he is primarily concerned with is the character and justification of the scientific method, not the logical status of theoretical entities. The crucial point to notice is (...)
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  5.  67
    W.V. Quine on Analyticity: “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” in Context.Andrew Lugg - 2012 - Dialogue 51 (2):231-246.
    RÉSUMÉ : Le but de W.V. Quine, dans «Deux dogmes de l’empirisme», n’est pas de prouver contre tous que la distinction analytique/synthétique est intenable ni de fournir une conception originale de la connaissance. Il veut plutôt ébranler l’attrait de l’empiriste pour la distinction et montrer ce en quoi réside un empirisme exempt de dogme. En me concentrant sur §§1-3 et §6, je soutiens que son traitement de l’analyticité est structuré par des hypothèses philosophiques fondamentales et que la conception de la (...)
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  6. Overdetermined problems in science.Andrew Lugg - 1978 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 9 (1):1-18.
    The purpose of this paper is to draw attention to a pattern of development, the significance of which has not been generally recognized. This pattern is characterized by an initial occurrence of what I shall call an overdetermined problem - i.e. a problem with no solution compatible with accepted belief and practice - followed by a resolution of the problem which relies on and exploits a change in what was previously taken as given.
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  7.  32
    Disagreement in science.Andrew Lugg - 1978 - Zeitschrift Für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 9 (2):276-292.
    Summary The argument of this paper is (1) that, contrary to what is often thought, there are cases of disagreement among scientists concerning the relative acceptability of theories which do not turn on nonrational or extra-scientific considerations, (2) that agreement cannot be secured without adversely affecting the scientific enterprise as we know it, and (3) that disagreement can be accommodated within a theory of scientific rationality and progress based on the idea that the relative acceptability of scientific theories is a (...)
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  8.  22
    Wittgenstein's Investigations 1-133: A Guide and Interpretation.Andrew Lugg - 2000 - New York: Routledge.
    First Published in 2004. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.
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  9.  78
    Russell and Wittgenstein on Incongruent Counterparts and Incompatible Colours.Andrew Lugg - 2015 - Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies 35 (1):43-58.
    Abstract:Russell (in Principles of Mathematics) and Wittgenstein (in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus) largely agree on the twin questions of why pairs of congruent objects cannot always be made to coincide and why surfaces can never be uniformly two colours at once. Both philosophers take space and colour to be mathematically representable, construe the relevant impossibilities as mathematical and hold that mathematical impossibility is at root logical. It is not by chance that Russell says nothing about the phenomena in his Introduction to the (...)
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  10.  56
    Theory choice and resistance to change.Andrew Lugg - 1980 - Philosophy of Science 47 (2):227-243.
    The object of this paper is twofold: to show that resistance to scientific change on the part of scientists need signal neither irrationality nor the presence of extra-scientific influences; and to show how such resistance can be accommodated within a theory of rational choice. After considerations have been outlined suggesting that scientists cannot rationally resist new scientific theories unless theory choice is subjectivistic (section I), evidence is adduced favoring the contrary view (section II). In section III, a non-subjectivistic, non-relativistic conception (...)
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  11.  37
    Wittgenstein and Scientific Representation.Andrew Lugg - 2019 - Wittgenstein-Studien 10 (1):211-226.
    Science figured in no small way in Wittgenstein’s philosophy, not least in his remarks about representation. Early and late he regarded theories like Newtonian mechanics as means of representing the world rather than as representations.While the notion of a form of representation looms largest in his early writings, it also informs his later remarks. His appropriation of the mathematical physicist’s conception of representation is as fundamental to Remarks on Colour (1950) as to the Tractatus (1918/1922).
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  12.  32
    (1 other version)Was Wittgenstein a conservative thinker?Andrew Lugg - 1985 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):465-474.
    Wittgenstein is often portrayed as a radical, even a revolutionary thinker and equally often said to lend aid and comfort to political conservatism. perhaps even as supplying it with a new and more profound rationale. While such interpretations of Wittgenstein are a useful antidote to the widely-held view that he was preoccupied with narrowly academic issues, neither can withstand much scrutiny. A consideration of why not does, however, clarify the general thrust of his thought and its significance for philosophy today.
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  13. Meaning through Pictures: Péter Forgács and Ludwig Wittgenstein.Andrew Lugg & Bela Szabados - 2011 - In Béla Szabados & Christina Stojanova (eds.), Wittgenstein at the Movies: Cinematic Investigations. Lanham, MD, USA: Lexington Books. pp. 91-120.
    Chapter in Wittgenstein at the Movies, an in-depth explorations of two experimental films on Wittgenstein: Derek Jarman's Wittgenstein and Péter Forgács' Wittgenstein Tractatus.
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  14.  94
    Wittgenstein’s True Thoughts.Andrew Lugg - 2013 - Nordic Wittgenstein Review 2 (1):33-56.
    Name der Zeitschrift: Nordic Wittgenstein Review Jahrgang: 2 Heft: 1 Seiten: 33-56.
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  15. Wittgenstein on colour exclusion : not fatally mistaken.Andrew Lugg - 1986 - In Abraham Zvie Bar-On (ed.), Grazer Philosophische Studien. Distributed in the U.S.A. By Humanities Press. pp. 1-21.
    The problem of colour exclusion is not fatal to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s early philosophy, nor was it the catalyst for his later philosophy. The remarks in the Tractatus about the impossibility of the simultaneous occurrence of two colours at a point in the visual field sit comfortably with the remarks in the rest of the book, the discussion of mathematical physics above all. Furthermore Wittgenstein’s second thoughts about the impossibility were a consequence, not the cause, of the subsequent turn in his (...)
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  16.  60
    A Sort of Prologue: Philosophical Investigations §§1–7.Andrew Lugg - 2012 - Philosophical Investigations 36 (1):20-36.
    §§1–7 of the Investigations should be taken at face value and not read against the grain. Wittgenstein is best understood as saying what he means and meaning what he says, and it is a mistake to suppose the examples of the shopkeeper and builders in §§1–2 cannot be read straightforwardly. The seven sections function as a prologue alerting the reader to the type of problem he intends to tackle and the type of approach he intends to pursue.
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  17. When and why was Remarks on Colour written – and why is it important to know?Andrew Lugg - 2014 - In Frederik Gierlinger & Štefan Joško Riegelnik (eds.), Wittgenstein on Colour. Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 1-20.
    A study of the origins of Wittgenstein's Remarks on Colour detailing when and why it was written.
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  18. (1 other version)The Limits of Scientific Reasoning. [REVIEW]Andrew Lugg - 1984 - Philosophy of Science 54 (1):137-138.
    Review of David Faust, The Limits of Scientific Reasoning.
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  19. Wittgenstein and Politics.Andrew Lugg - 2004 - International Studies in Philosophy 36 (1):61-79.
    There is nothing in Wittgenstein's philosophical writings remotely approaching an unambiguous expression of right-wing or left-wing sentiments. The words "politics" and "political" do not figure in his work and politicians are referred to only in passing. All that can reasonably be argued is that his philosophy has indirect implications for how we should collectively live our lives, approach political problems or think about political theory. In this paper I critically examine claims that have been made regarding the significance of his (...)
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  20. More on Russell and Quine - A Reply to Stevens.Andrew Lugg - 2006 - The Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly 130 (May):31-37.
    A response to Graham Stevens’s response to Lugg, ‘Russell as a Precursor of Quine’ (Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly, nos. 128-129, pp. 9-21). Stevens challenges the argument of this paper that from 1912, if not earlier, Russell was “a naturalistically-minded epistemologist in the Quinean mould”. He maintains that to the contrary “Russell cannot be accurately characterized as an empiricist” and “Russell’s greatest influence on Quine’s naturalistic project did not stem from his epistemology but from his semantics”. In the present note it (...)
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  21. An alternative to the traditional model? Laudan on disagreement and consensus in science.Andrew Lugg - 1986 - Philosophy of Science 53 (3):419-424.
    Criticism of Larry Laudan's views on disagreement and progress in science.
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  22. Russell as a Precursor of Quine.Andrew Lugg - 2005 - The Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly 128 (November):9-22.
    On Russell's and Quine's "naturalism".
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  23. (1 other version)Tom Sorell on Scientism.Andrew Lugg & J. F. McDonald - 1993 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 23 (2):291-298.
    Critical notice of Tom Sorell's Scientism: Philosophy and the Infatuation with Science.
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  24. (1 other version)Wesley C. Salmon, Four Decades of Scientific Explanation Reviewed by.Andrew Lugg - 1991 - Philosophy in Review 11 (1):68-69.
    Review of Wesley Salmon's Four Decades of Scientific Explanation.
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  25. Kuhn and the Philosophy of Science: Theories of Science.Andrew Lugg - 1979 - British Journal for the History of Science 12 (3):289-295.
    Discussion of centred on Kuhn's Essential Tension.
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  26. Overinterpreting Wittgenstein.Andrew Lugg - 2010 - Wittgenstein-Studien 1 (1):171-190.
    Although Wittgenstein maintains that there are no theses in philosophy, he is regularly interpreted as advancing or committed to such theses. In this paper I consider a striking case in point, Merrill Ring’s discussion of §19(b), §20(a) and §20(b) of the Philosophical Investigations. I compare Ring's account of the text with Wittgenstein's actual words and stress the importance of refraining from taking Wittgenstein to be engaged in an explanatory or theoretical enterprise.
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  27. Nicholas Maxwell's Intellectual Revolution.Andrew Lugg - 1987 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 17 (3):435-437.
    Grumpy short discussion of Nicholas Maxwell's From Knowledge to Wisdom.
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  28.  85
    Wittgenstein on Showing What Cannot Be Said.Andrew Lugg - 2014 - Philosophical Investigations 37 (3):246-257.
    The distinction between saying and showing in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is not self-refuting, unbelievable or nonsensical. It makes good sense given Wittgenstein's equation of saying with communicable information and showing with necessarily true thought. The key to understanding his thinking is his claim in the Preface that unassailable and definitive truths are expressed in the book, and the subsidiary assumption that asserting empty truths is nonsensical. His conception of pictures, propositions, logic, mathematics, mathematical physics, mysticism, the inexpressible and solipsism as showing (...)
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  29.  42
    Wittgenstein on Transparent White.Andrew Lugg - 2014 - Wittgenstein-Studien 5 (1).
    Name der Zeitschrift: Wittgenstein-Studien Jahrgang: 5 Heft: 1 Seiten: 205-226.
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  30. (1 other version)'The priority of paradigms' revisited.Andrew Lugg - 1987 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 18 (1-2):175-182.
    In diesem Beitrag liefere ich eine Interpretation und Verteidigung der These Thomas Kuhns von der Priorität von Paradigmen. Ich behaupte, daß Kuhns Argument für diese These wichtiger, als gewöhnlich angenommen wird, ist, und zwar sowohl für die Klärung seiner Ideen als auch für die Wissenschaftstheorie im allgemeinen. Anerkennt man seine Kritik an der üblichen Auffassung, daß Regeln den Paradigmen vorausgehen, so erscheint vieles von dem, was er über andere Gegenstände sagt, in einem neuen Licht, und viele Schwierigkeiten, die Philosophen bei (...)
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  31. Explaining scientific beliefs: The rationalist's strategy re-examined.Andrew Lugg - 1983 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 13 (3):265-278.
    Analysis of how intellectual historians and sociologists of science differ.
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  32. (1 other version)Garfinkel on Forms of Explanation.Andrew Lugg - 1983 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 13 (4):633-646.
    Critical Notice of Alan Garfinkel's Forms of Explanation.
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  33. Images of Science.Howard Duncan & Andrew Lugg - 1988 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 18 (4):795-804.
  34. Putnam on reductionism.Andrew Lugg - 1974 - Cognition 3 (3):289-293.
    Putnam argues that reductionism, “the doctrine that the laws of such ‘higher level’ sciences as psychology and sociology are reducible to the laws of lower-level sciences - biology, chemistry, ultimately to the laws of elementary particle physics”, is wrong. In this note, I take issue with some of Putnam’s arguments.
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  35. What generativism is not: A reply to Brian Baigrie.Andrew Lugg - 1991 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 23 (3):499-501.
    Brief response to Brian Baigrie's "The Justification of Kepler’s Ellipse" (1990).
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  36. Les pratiques pseudo-scientifiques.Andrew Lugg - 1983 - Dialogue 22 (2):239-251.
    There is no satisfactory way of distinguishing the parodies of science from the genuine thing. Philosophers tend to think science and pseudoscience differ in kind, but the fact is they differ mostly in degree.
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  37.  39
    Effects of instruction and stimulus presentation on the occurrence of averaging responses in impression formation.Harry F. Gollob & Andrew M. Lugg - 1973 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 98 (1):217.
  38.  32
    Consensus and common ground.Andrew Lugg - 1991 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 53 (3):474 - 488.
    Philosophers concerned with the character of scientific disputes tend to divide into two camps. On the one side there are those who hold that scientists can always settle their differences by appealing to shared assumptions; on the other side there are those who maintain that in many cases scientists must resort to (nonrational ) persuasion to establish their views. The trouble is that for all their strong points both approaches labour under enormous difficulties. Scientific disagreement is often much deeper than (...)
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  39.  15
    Critical notice of T.W. Adorno et aI., The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology.Andrew Lugg - 1979 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 9 (4):739-756.
    Critical notice of T.W. Adorno et aI., The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology. (Paper has many typographical errors but it is readable.).
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  40.  31
    Feyerabend's Rationalism.Andrew Lugg - 1977 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7 (4):755 - 775.
    I like to say there is no scientific method as such, but rather only the free and utmost use of intelligence.P.W. BridgmanIt is generally believed—see, for example, Lakatos, Dorling, Koertge, Gellner, and Finnocchiaro—that Feyerabend is committed to the view that science is an essentially irrational enterprise. In this paper, I argue initially that this is so only if Feyerabend is saddled with an unreasonable notion of rationality. Next, I point out, first, that there is a reasonable notion of rationality which (...)
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  41.  43
    Rationality, Scientific Growth, and Large-Scale Systems of Belief.Andrew Lugg - 1983 - der 16. Weltkongress Für Philosophie 2:822-829.
    The argument of this paper is that Kuhn's account of rational theory choice is too permissive and that an account that recognizes the large-scale nature of the system of scientific beliefs is more plausible and has more practical force.
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  42. G. P. Baker and P. M. S. Hacker, Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity. Oxford: Basil Blackwell (1985), xvi + 352 pp. $49.95 (cloth). [REVIEW]Andrew Lugg - 1988 - Philosophy of Science 55 (3):486-487.
    Review of G.P. Baker and P.M.S. Hacker's Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity, the second volume of their analytical commentary on Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations.
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  43. Scientific Discovery: Case Studies. [REVIEW]Andrew Lugg - 1982 - Philosophy of Science 49 (1):138-140.
    Review of T. Nickles (ed), Scientific Discovery: Case Studies.
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  44. Review symposium : Laurens Laudan. Progress and its problems: Toward a theory of scientific growth. Berkeley and Los Angeles: The University of California Press, 1977. Pp. X + 257.Laudan's progress and its problems. [REVIEW]David L. Hull, Andrew Lugg, Robert E. Butts & I. C. Jarvie - 1979 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 9 (4):457-465.
  45. Review Symposium : Laudan and the Problem-Solving Approach to Scientific Progress and Rationality. [REVIEW]Andrew Lugg - 1979 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 9 (4):466-474.
    Critical discussion of Larry Laudan's problem-solving approach to scientific progress and rationality as presented in his Progress and Its Problems.
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  46. (1 other version)Ray Monk, Bertrand Russell: The Spirit of Solitude Reviewed by. [REVIEW]Andrew Lugg - 1996 - Philosophy in Review 16 (4):267-270.
    Review of BERTRAND RUSSELL: THE SPIRIT OF SOLITUDE, the first volume of Ray Monk's biography of Russell.
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  47. Bertrand Russell, My Philosophical Development. [REVIEW]Andrew Lugg - 1997 - Philosophy in Review 17 (3):209-211.
    Review of a reissue of Russell's My Philosophical Development.
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  48. Paul Feyerabend, Against Method. [REVIEW]Andrew Lugg - 1995 - Philosophy in Review 15 (1):35-37.
    Review of the third edition of Paul Feyerabend's Against Method.
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  49. (1 other version)Raymond L. Wilder, Mathematics as a Cultural System Reviewed by. [REVIEW]Andrew Lugg - 1982 - Philosophy in Review 2 (1):37-39.
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  50. Michael Potter, Wittgenstein's Notes on Logic. [REVIEW]Andrew Lugg - 2009 - Philosophy in Review 29 (6):435.
    Review of Michael Potter's Wittgenstein's Notes on Logic.
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