Synthese 191 (7):1-23 (2014)

Authors
Stefan Lukits
University of Toronto, St. George Campus
Abstract
Sometimes we receive evidence in a form that standard conditioning (or Jeffrey conditioning) cannot accommodate. The principle of maximum entropy (MAXENT) provides a unique solution for the posterior probability distribution based on the intuition that the information gain consistent with assumptions and evidence should be minimal. Opponents of objective methods to determine these probabilities prominently cite van Fraassen’s Judy Benjamin case to undermine the generality of maxent. This article shows that an intuitive approach to Judy Benjamin’s case supports maxent. This is surprising because based on independence assumptions the anticipated result is that it would support the opponents. It also demonstrates that opponents improperly apply independence assumptions to the problem
Keywords Judy Benjamin  Principle of maximum entropy  Coarsening at random  Full employment theorem  Probability kinematics  Epistemic entrenchment
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Reprint years 2014
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-013-0335-8
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References found in this work BETA

The Logic of Decision.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1965 - University of Chicago Press.
Updating Subjective Probability.Persi Diaconis & Sandy L. Zabell - 1982 - Journal of the American Statistical Association 77 (380):822-830.

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