- New
-
Topics
- All Categories
- Metaphysics and Epistemology
- Value Theory
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Logic and Philosophy of Logic
- Philosophy of Biology
- Philosophy of Cognitive Science
- Philosophy of Computing and Information
- Philosophy of Mathematics
- Philosophy of Physical Science
- Philosophy of Social Science
- Philosophy of Probability
- General Philosophy of Science
- Philosophy of Science, Misc
- History of Western Philosophy
- Philosophical Traditions
- Philosophy, Misc
- Other Academic Areas
- Journals
- Submit material
- More
Updating Subjective Probability
Journal of the American Statistical Association 77 (380):822-830 (1982)
Abstract
This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)Author's Profile
My notes
Similar books and articles
A Rule For Updating Ambiguous Beliefs.Cesaltina Pacheco Pires - 2002 - Theory and Decision 53 (2):137-152.
Methodology: The Elements of the Philosophy of Science.David Papineau - 1995 - In A. C. Grayling (ed.), Philosophy: a guide through the subject. New York: Oxford University Press.
Updating: A psychologically basic situation of probability revision.Jean Baratgin & Guy Politzer - 2010 - Thinking and Reasoning 16 (4):253-287.
All Probabilistic Methods Assume a Subjective Definition of Probability.Mark Crovelli - 2012 - Libertarian Papers 4.
Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens for Conditional Probabilities, and Updating on Uncertain Evidence.Jordan Howard Sobel - 2009 - Theory and Decision 66 (2):103 - 148.
Defeasible Conditionalization.Paul D. Thorn - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (2-3):283-302.
Countable additivity and subjective probability.Jon Williamson - 1999 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (3):401-416.
Analytics
Added to PP
2011-02-11
Downloads
2 (#1,803,862)
6 months
1 (#1,469,946)
2011-02-11
Downloads
2 (#1,803,862)
6 months
1 (#1,469,946)
Historical graph of downloads
Author's Profile
Citations of this work
An Objective Justification of Bayesianism II: The Consequences of Minimizing Inaccuracy.Hannes Leitgeb & Richard Pettigrew - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (2):236-272.
Being Realist about Bayes, and the Predictive Processing Theory of Mind.Matteo Colombo, Lee Elkin & Stephan Hartmann - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (1):185-220.
What is conditionalization, and why should we do it?Richard Pettigrew - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3427-3463.
A defense of imprecise credences in inference and decision making1.James M. Joyce - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):281-323.
PhilPapers logo by Andrea Andrews and Meghan Driscoll.
This site uses cookies and Google Analytics (see our terms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications). Use of this site is subject to terms & conditions.
All rights reserved by The PhilPapers Foundation
Server: philpapers-web-64dd777598-vk9kt uwo