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Qualitative confirmation and the ravens paradox
Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 83 (1):89-108 (2005)
Abstract
In From Instrumentalism to Constructive Realism Theo Kuipers presents a theory of qualitative confirmation that is supposed to not assume the existence of quantitative probabilities. He claims that this theory is able to resolve some paradoxes in confirmation theory, including the ravens paradox. This paper shows that there are flaws in Kuipers' qualitative confirmation theory and in his application of it to the ravens paradox.Links
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Citations of this work
La teoría correspondentista de la verdad y la confirmación científica.Damián Islas Mondragón - 2021 - Sophia. Colección de Filosofía de la Educación 31:65-87.
References found in this work
Aspects of scientific explanation.Carl G. Hempel - 1965 - In Carl Gustav Hempel (ed.), Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science. New York: The Free Press. pp. 504.
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