In From Instrumentalism to Constructive Realism Theo Kuipers presents a theory of qualitative confirmation that is supposed to not assume the existence of quantitative probabilities. He claims that this theory is able to resolve some paradoxes in confirmation theory, including the ravens paradox. This paper shows that there are flaws in Kuipers' qualitative confirmation theory and in his application of it to the ravens paradox.
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Philosophy of Biology.Elliott Sober - 1993 - Westview Press.
Aspects of Scientific Explanation.Asa Kasher - 1965 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 37 (4):747-749.

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The Non-Standard Approach to Confirmation and the Ravens Paradoxes: Reply to Patrick Maher.Theo A. F. Kuipers - 2005 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 83 (1):109-128.


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