Abstract

Odnos Ortege do Husserlove fenomenologije je v zadnjih desetih letih postal ena najpomembnejših točk kritike španskega filozofa. Kar se je njegovim učencem zdelo že izčrpano vprašanje, se je izkazalo odločilnega pomena. V ta odnos je marveč vgrajen sklepnik razumevanja te filozofije. Odvisnost Ortegove filozofije od Husserlove fenomenologije sem poskušal dokazati na drugem mestu, pri čemer sem prišel do sklepa, da tvorijo Logične raziskave, Ideje I in raziskave fenomenologov v Husserlovem göttinškem krogu nujen okvir za ključne pojme Ortegove teoretične filozofije. V kritiki odnosa Ortege do Husserla pa je pomembno, da datiramo posamezne Ortegove trditve, ker potem lahko ugotovimo, da trditev, da je presegel in zapustil Husserlovo fenomenologijo, takoj ko jo je spoznal, namreč izvira šele iz poznih let, natančno, iz leta 1929.In the last decades, the relationship between Ortega and Husserl’s phenomenology has become one of the crucial points of the critical approach to Ortega. What students of Ortega found as exhausted issues later proved decisive. The relationship between the two namely reveals the grain of salt of his philosophy. I discussed the dependence of Ortega’s philosophy on Husserl’s phenomenology elsewhere; there I argued, as a result, that Logical Investigations, Ideas I and research works done by other phenomenologists from Husserl’s Göttingen circle, prove of utmost importance for the key concepts of Ortega’s theoretical philosophy. However, if we want to criticize Ortega’s relationship with Husserl, we have to pay special attention to the dating of Ortega’s individual claims: namely, this could well lead us to the conclusion that the claim that Ortega went beyond the confines of Husserl’s phenomenology the moment he tackled it, stems from his later period, more exactly from 1929