Abstract

Issues related to the philosophy of ethics are discussed not independently but dispersedly and relevant to other issues in the works of most Muslim philosophers, including Avicenna. This dispersion and thematic incoherence has sometimes led to misunderstandings and misinterpretations and even to unreal claims about their views on ethics. For example, there are some statements in Avicenna’s different books to the effect that moral propositions are a type of well-known propositions. These statements have made many intellectuals to claim that moral propositions have social and collective identity with no reality other than men’s consensus, according to Avicenna’s view on ethics. No doubt, this claim will lead to such dilemmas as ethical contractarianism and even to ethical relativism, of which Avicenna’s philosophical though is devoid. Citing the statements which have led to such claim, the present paper seeks to deny and resolve this wrong misunderstanding and claim and propose a comprehensive strategy to differentiate different ethical domains in order that other misunderstandings and fallacies are avoided in similar cases. Finally, using the proposed strategy, it rereads the statements narrated from Avicenna and proves that these statements can never lead to a perception implying ethical unrealism and contractarianism.