Abstract

To some extent, perhaps under Moore's chastening influence, eccentric philosophical denials of the existence of physical objects, other people's minds, the past, and so on, have gone out of fashion. All the same there is at least one very common philosophical conclusion which, though not as extravagant as these, is no less paradoxical. This is the dogma that ethical statements could not describe anything at all, and the collateral claim that they could not be true or false. This is, I suggest, as paradoxical as traditional denials of the existence of chairs and tables, since the denial that ethical statements could be descriptive, like the denial that chairs and tables could exist, is opposed by the common observation that ethical statements do describe, just as the other is opposed by the common observation that chairs and tables do exist. I hope to make two things perfectly clear. First of all, that ethical statements do describe states of affairs; and secondly, that the reason ultimately given for saying that they could not describe anything, namely that they differ in verification from statements of fact, is only partly true, and its uncritical acceptance has led to the canonisation of the belief that ethical statements are non-descriptive and have no truth-values