Abstract

This dissertation deals with the concept of responsibility. In Chapter I, I analyze two sub-classes of responsibility: mere causal responsibility and personal responsibility. The particular focus of the paper is generic personal responsibility; i.e., generic in the sense that it is not confined to a specific type of personal responsibility, and personal in the sense that it applies only to persons. In Section 2.1 of Chapter II, I establish the concept of generic personal responsibility by arguing that it is the kind of responsibility that we have for ordinary acts such as eating, walking, and talking. I claim that the theory of personal responsibility presented in Chapter I can be regarded as a theory of generic personal responsibility. In Section 2.2 of Chapter II, I argue that generic personal responsibility is entailed by every specific type of personal responsibility, but does not itself entail any specific type of personal responsibility. In Chapter III, I review what other philosophers have said about this concept. Only one philosopher, Scott Davison, mentions a similar concept of "responsibility simpliciter." I examine Davison's moral responsibility theory as well as his concept. I also explore the moral responsibility theories of John Martin Fischer and Michael Zimmerman as well as their views on responsibility for neutral acts. I compare those to my own and conclude that none of these authors have as comprehensive a view about responsibility for neutral acts as I do. Finally in Chapter IV, I address important objections to my theory. I reject the latest interpretation of Frankfurt-like cases that purportedly show that alternate possibilities are not needed for moral responsibility and thereby vindicate my freedom condition. I discuss problem cases such as overdetermined causation, and cases of ignorance, accidents and moral luck. I conclude that my theory has a credible approach to offer in these kinds of cases. I discuss why the concept of generic personal responsibility is philosophically important. I claim that several clarifications can be gained that resolve confusions about personal responsibility currently found in the literature. I discuss how my analysis functions as a minimalist theory of personal responsibility and mention the theoretical advantages of minimalist theories