Episteme and Subjectivity: The Context does not solve the “Gettier Problem”


Authors
Dimitry Mentuz
Warnborough Colledge, Ireland (Alumnus)
Abstract
Objective: In this essay, I will try to track some historical and modern stages of the discussion on the Gettier problem, and point out the interrelations of the questions that this problem raises for epistemologists, with sceptical arguments, and a so-called problem of relevance. Methods: historical analysis, induction, generalization, deduction, discourse, intuition results: Albeit the contextual theories of knowledge, the use of different definitions of knowledge, and the different ways of the uses of knowledge do not resolve all the issues that the sceptic can put forward, but they can be productive in giving clarity to a concept of knowledge for us. On the other hand, our knowledge will always have an element of intuition and subjectivity, however not equating to epistemic luck and probability. Significance novelty: the approach to the context in general, not giving up being a Subject may give us a clarity about the sense of what it means to say – “I know”.
Keywords Gettier  Episteme  Context  Subject  Knowledge  Sense  Justification  Belief  Truth
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A Proposed Definition of Propositional Knowledge.Peter D. Klein - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (16):471-482.
Knowledge, Truth and Evidence.Keith Lehrer - 1965 - Analysis 25 (5):168 - 175.

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