Philosophia Christi 15 (1):81-96 (2013)

Angus John Louis Menuge
Concordia University Wisconsin
John Searle claims that reasoning requires libertarian free will. He hopes this can be reconciled with a naturalistic neuroscience through a sophisticated theory of emergence, which includes indeterminism, and topdown causation. This is allegedly naturalistic because each mental state is causally reducible to a realizing neuronal state. I argue that Searle’s theory fails to overcome four main problems and cannot account for reasoning without implicit appeal to nonnaturalistic entities.
Keywords Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy and Religion
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DOI 10.5840/pc20131518
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