Philosophia Christi 15 (1):97-118 (2013)

Eric LaRock
Oakland University
I argue (1) that Searle's reductive stance about mental causation is unwarranted on evolutionary, logical, and neuroscientific grounds; and (2) that his theory of weak emergence, called biological naturalism, fails to provide a satisfactory account of objectual unity and subject unity. Finally I propose a stronger variety of emergence called emergent subject dualism (ESD) to fill the gaps in Searle's account, and support ESD on grounds of recent evidence in neuroscience. Hence I show how it is possible, if not also theoretically preferable, to go from Searle's biological naturalism to emergent subject dualism.
Keywords Emergent Dualism  Mental Causation  Neuroscience  Searle  Subject Unity
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DOI 10.5840/pc20131519
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