Religious Studies 43 (2):217-228 (2007)

Tony Milligan
University of Hertfordshire
The following paper sets out a view of humility that is derived from Iris Murdoch but which differs from a strict Murdochian approach in two important respects. Firstly, any association with self-abnegation is removed; and secondly, the value of a limited form of pride (recognition pride) is affirmed. The paper is nevertheless strongly continuous with her work, in the sense that it builds upon her rejection of universalizability on the specific grounds that we have varying moral competences. A liberal commitment to equality should not be allowed to spill out of the political domain. We are not all equal when it comes to the demands of morality. Humility is treated as a just discernment of our own limited moral competences. As such, it is a recognition of our particularity and not a form of radical self-effacement
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DOI 10.1017/s0034412506008808
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Modesty and Humility.Nicolas Bommarito - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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