Abstract

A philospher's analysis of resemblance between objects is pivotal because it must be directly consistent with both his epistemology and his metaphysics. If he sees resemblance as ultimately simple and immediate, then he will deny the reality of universals, embracing nominalism, and will base knowledge ultimately on direct experience, embracing empiricism. Or, if he sees resemblance as based on identity, then he is committed to the reality of universals. He then can claim that our knowledge is of universals, as present in, but not confined to, direct experience. He will thus be a realist with respect to universals, and a rationalist with respect to knowledge. ;The debate in Mind 1893 between William James and F. H. Bradley concerning the nature of resemblance presents a clash between these extremes. In the debate , James presents three arguments against an identity analysis of resemblance, to which Bradley responds that the arguments are inapplicable to his theory. An examination of James's epistemology shows us that he must permit identity in resemblance. Bradley's logic and metaphysics are explored , culminating in his doctrine of identity-in-difference, or the concrete universal. ;In Ch. V we use Bradley's concrete universal to demonstrate that James's arguments do not apply to such a theory. We then argue that the concrete universal provides James with the identity he needs to preserve his epistemology. ;James's advocacy of simple resemblance follows from a refusal to endorse platonistic metaphysics, and from a refusal to draw metaphysical implications from his epistemology. Bradley's advocacy of identity follows directly from his logic and his metaphysics. The conclusion drawn is that their disagreement in the Mind debate was misleading. A more fundamental disagreement concerns a willingness to draw conclusions about reality from the requirements of thought and knowledge. This Bradley will do, whereas James will not, so that he continues to advocate simple resemblance as a possibility and a fact