Becoming a Good Human Being: Aristotle on Virtue and Its Cultivation

In Christoph Halbig & Felix Timmermann (eds.), Handbuch Tugend Und Tugendethik. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden. pp. 123-145 (2021)
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Abstract

In deliberate contrast to the ethical intellectualism of Socrates, Aristotle develops a complex conception of virtues as character traits which are closely tied to the different elements and stages of their cultivation: in the gradual process of becoming good, ‘learning by doing’ is the central cornerstone for establishing a close connectivity between emotion and reason as well as between desire, decision and right action. Virtue as a perfection of human nature engenders the best possible integration of irrational striving with reason in the soul and is thus the constitutive component of human flourishing.

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