Legal Positivism and Deontic Detachment

Ratio Juris 31 (1):4-8 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I consider a puzzle that arises when the logical principle known as “deontic detachment” is applied to the law. It is not possible to accept the principle of deontic detachment in a legal setting while also accepting that the so-called “social facts thesis” applies to all legal propositions. According to the social facts thesis, the existence and content of law is determined by the attitudes or practices of legal officials. Abandoning deontic detachment is not an appropriate solution to the problem—the puzzle can be recreated with other plausible closure principles. The problem can be solved by restricting the social facts thesis to legal rules, rather than applying it to all legal propositions. Properly construed the social facts thesis does not apply to facts about what legally ought to be the case.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,031

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

“How to Hold the Social Fact Thesis – a Reply to Greenberg and Toh,”.Barbara Baum Levenbook - 2013 - In Leslie Green & Brian Leiter (eds.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law vol. 2. Oxford UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 75-102.
On the concept and the nature of law.Robert Alexy - 2008 - Ratio Juris 21 (3):281-299.
How Can 'Positivism' Account for Legal Adjudicative Duty?Christopher P. Taggart - 2013 - Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 33 (1):169-196.
Detachment and Deontic Language in Law.Robert Mullins - 2018 - Law and Philosophy 37 (4):351-384.
Presupposing Legal Authority.Robert Mullins - 2022 - Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 42 (2):411-437.
Beyond inclusive legal positivism.Jules L. Coleman - 2009 - Ratio Juris 22 (3):359-394.
Beyond Inclusive Legal Positivism.Jules L. Coleman - 2009 - Ratio Juris 22 (3):359-394.
Deontic logic and legal philosophy.Pablo Navarro - 2009 - In Susana Nuccetelli, Ofelia Schutte & Otávio Bueno (eds.), A Companion to Latin American Philosophy. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 439–453.

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-02-27

Downloads
40 (#410,144)

6 months
4 (#863,447)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Robert Mullins
University of Queensland

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

What 'must' and 'can' must and can mean.Angelika Kratzer - 1977 - Linguistics and Philosophy 1 (3):337--355.
Practical Reason and Norms.Joseph Raz - 1975 - Law and Philosophy 12 (3):329-343.
Practical Reason and Norms.C. H. Whiteley - 1976 - Philosophical Quarterly 26 (104):287-288.
The Authority of Law.Alan R. White & J. Raz - 1980 - Philosophical Quarterly 30 (120):278.
Legal Positivism: 5½ Myths.John Gardner - 2001 - American Journal of Jurisprudence 46 (1):199-227.

View all 9 references / Add more references