Linguistics and Philosophy 1 (3):337--355 (1977)
Authors |
|
Abstract |
In this paper I offer an account of the meaning of must and can within the framework of possible worlds semantics. The paper consists of two parts: the first argues for a relative concept of modality underlying modal words like must and can in natural language. I give preliminary definitions of the meaning of these words which are formulated in terms of logical consequence and compatibility, respectively. The second part discusses one kind of insufficiency in the meaning definitions given in the first part, which arise from the ex falso quodlibet paradox of logical consequence. In stepwise fashion, I make an attempt to avoid most of the consequences of this paradox for the meaning definitions of must and can.
|
Keywords | language |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
DOI | 10.1007/BF00353453 |
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
Logics and Languages.Max Cresswell - 1973 - London: Methuen [Distributed in the U.S.A. By Harper & Row.
View all 8 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
Restrictions on Quantifier Domains.Kai von Fintel - 1994 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts at Amherst
Will Done Better: Selection Semantics, Future Credence, and Indeterminacy.Fabrizio Cariani & Paolo Santorio - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):129-165.
View all 303 citations / Add more citations
Similar books and articles
Family Resemblances, Relationalism, and the Meaning of 'Art'.Daniel A. Kaufman - 2007 - British Journal of Aesthetics 47 (3):280-297.
Jivacide, Zombies and Jivanmuktas: The Meaning of Life in the Bhagavad Git.A. L. Herman - 1991 - Asian Philosophy 1 (1):5 – 13.
Understanding the Logical Constants and Dispositions.Corine Besson - 2009 - The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 5:1-24.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2009-01-28
Total views
547 ( #15,740 of 2,505,145 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
18 ( #47,593 of 2,505,145 )
2009-01-28
Total views
547 ( #15,740 of 2,505,145 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
18 ( #47,593 of 2,505,145 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads