Abstract

Emmanuel Levinas has proven a major figure in twentieth-century phenomenology and ethics, and his work has influenced not only Jewish but also Christian ethical thought. However, Levinas has recently been the subject of trenchant critique by his fellow French philosopher, Jean-Yves Lacoste. Lacoste objects to Levinas’s construal of intersubjectivity as fundamentally ethical: essentially, that we only instantiate our humanity when we take responsibility for the Other. This smacks for Lacoste of ‘unworldliness’, and is thus phenomenologically inadequate, since it extirpates from the domain of elementary experiences everything that does not constitute morality. This raises key questions: how best to interpret Lacoste’s challenge; how successful that challenge is, i.e. whether anything in Levinas’s project survive it; and, if so, how best to understand Levinas’s relevance for Christian ethics. I will address all these issues, contending that, contra Lacoste, Levinas’s position does stand up to inspection at one key juncture. I claim, on phenomenological grounds, that it tells us something of vital importance about some special experiences of obligation, some range of moral encounters: that which arises when the subject, as moral agent, finds himself in an immediate, unbidden, dyadic encounter with the other person.