Cheyne's paradox – and how to solve it

Ratio 25 (2):231-242 (2012)
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Abstract

Colin Cheyne's ‘paradox of reasonable believing’ poses a problem for both internalist and externalist theories of rationality. Cheyne suggests that externalists will more easily solve it. I argue the opposite

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