The case for intrinsic theory V: Some arguments from James's varieties

Journal of Mind and Behavior 22 (1):41-67 (2001)
Abstract
This and the planned next article of the present series mine the wealth of reports and astute discussions of states of consciousness contained in William James’s The Varieties of Religious Experience. Thus, I bring out further arguments in favor of the kind of understanding of consciousness4, or inner awareness, that, as it happens, James explicitly opposed in The Principles of Psychology. The alternative, appendage kind of account that James advanced there for consciousness4 stands in marked contrast to intrinsic theory: by requiring that having inner awareness of any mental-occurrence instance must take the form of a separate mental-occurrence instance directed on the first. Intrinsic theory holds instead that every conscious4 mental-occurrence instance possesses a phenomenological structure that includes reference to that very instance itself
Keywords Consciousness  Intrinsic  Mental  Metaphysics  James
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The Case for Intrinsic Theory: I. An Introduction.Thomas Natsoulas - 1996 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 17 (3):267-286.
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