Philosophical Psychology 2 (2):207-15 (1989)
John Searle has argued that one can imagine embodying a machine running any computer program without understanding the symbols, and hence that purely computational processes do not yield understanding. The disagreement this argument has generated stems, I hold, from ambiguity in talk of 'understanding'. The concept is analysed as a relation between subjects and symbols having two components: a formal and an intentional. The central question, then becomes whether a machine could possess the intentional component with or without the formal component. I argue that the intentional state of a symbol's being meaningful to a subject is a functionally definable relation between the symbol and certain past and present states of the subject, and that a machine could bear this relation to a symbol. I sketch a machine which could be said to possess, in primitive form, the intentional component of understanding. Even if the machine, in lacking consciousness, lacks full understanding, it contributes to a theory of understanding and constitutes a counterexample to the Chinese Room argument
|Keywords||Consciousness Intention Machine Metaphysics Symbolization Searle, J|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology.Daniel C. Dennett (ed.) - 1978 - Bradford Books.
From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief.Stephen P. Stich - 1983 - MIT Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Similar books and articles
Consciousness and Understanding in the Chinese Room.Simone Gozzano - 1995 - Informatica 19:653-56.
Weak Strong AI: An Elaboration of the English Reply to the Chinese Room.Ronald L. Chrisley - unknown
Searle's Experiments with Thought.William J. Rapaport - 1986 - Philosophy of Science 53 (June):271-9.
The Chinese Room Argument: Consciousness and Understanding.Simone Gozzano - 1997 - In Matjaz Gams, M. Paprzycki & X. Wu (eds.), Mind Versus Computer: Were Dreyfus and Winograd Right? Amsterdam: IOS Press. pp. 43--231.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads16 ( #297,935 of 2,170,053 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #345,514 of 2,170,053 )
How can I increase my downloads?