Abstract

This thesis argues for the general implausibility of pure determinism by refuting the constitutive logical categories of specific forms of determinism. Pure determinism is understood as the metaphysical thesis that everything is fundamentally externally determined. The underlying categories in question are necessity, causality and objectivity (law). The specific forms of determinism are necessitarian- (or conditional necessity), causal- and metaphysical (or lawful) determinism. The refutation concerning the relevant logical forms or categories is grounded in the systematic conceptual analysis developed in The Science of Logic by G. W. F. Hegel. The second part of the main argument is to show that, although pure or particular forms of determinism may fail, this does not entail that deterministic features as such are thereby dismissed or are unreal. The third part of the argument indicates that such deterministic features are only logically coherent as moments of a structure of self-determination, which means, in turn, that self-determination cannot be fully understood without making explicit its relationship to (other-)determination. While almost nobody theoretically defends the position of determinism, it is invariably used in discussions surrounding freedom, particularly as a contrast or opposition to it. This opposition chiefly takes the positions of compatibilism and incompatibilism. This thesis contends, however, that determinism within such positions remains ill-defined and that, when examined logically, through its constituent categories, there is in fact no consistent concept of determinism one might oppose to freedom. Instead, deterministic features—normally seen to be wholly separate from freedom—form essential moments of it. Hegel’s Logic demonstrates, therefore, that external determination or unfreedom is integral to the reality and development of self-determination or freedom as such, whereby the latter is justified through the former, and the former through the latter.