Abstract

Abstract. This study analyses and assesses the notion of « signification » deployed in « De int. » 1 and its role in the whole of « De int. » Four main conclusions are reached: (i) The semantic observations of « De int. » 1 provide linguistic elements and linguistic background to explain contrary pairs, contradictory pairs, statement-making-sentences, and truth and falsehood. (ii) In « De int. » 1, Aristotle restricts his semantic interests to elements and relations necessary for explaining contrary and contradictory pairs of assertions, and he does this at the expense of other linguistic and semantic issues that may be important for us, such as communication and linguistic content. As a consequence, Aristotle’s linguistic terminology in « De int. » 1, and the « De int. » in general, does not explicitly distinguish different senses of « signification » and obscures some aspects of the linguistic distinctions between statement-making-sentences, non-statement-making-sentences, and compound nouns. (iii) « De int. » 1 presupposes a distinction between simple vocalized-sounds and complex vocalized-sounds which implies a very rough notion of compositionality, according to which complex vocalized-sounds consist of simple vocalized-sounds. (iv) « De int. » 1 does not contain a theory of what we call « meaning », for its main concern is neither how we manage to understand or be motivated by expressions, nor what we request when we fail to understand or be motivated by an expression.