Philosophia 43 (3):723-729 (2015)

Authors
Gerard O'Brien
University of Adelaide
Jonathan Opie
University of Adelaide
Abstract
In their target article, Hutto and Satne eloquently articulate the failings of most current attempts to naturalize mental content. Furthermore, we think they are correct in their insistence that the only way forward is by drawing a distinction between two kinds of intentionality, one of which is considerably weaker than—and should be deployed to explain—the propositional variety most philosophers take for granted. The problem is that their own rendering of this weaker form of intentionality—contentless intentionality—is too weak. What’s needed is a species of intentionality distinct from both the industrial-strength version beloved by philosophers and the intentionality lite recommended by Hutto and Satne. We briefly motivate and sketch this alternative, and say a few words about the account of cognition that it spawns.
Keywords Analog  Cognition  Intentionality  Mental content  Representation
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2016
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s11406-015-9623-5
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 60,842
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Language of Thought.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - Harvard University Press.
The Nature of Explanation.Kenneth James Williams Craik - 1943 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Intelligence Without Representation.Rodney A. Brooks - 1991 - Artificial Intelligence 47 (1--3):139-159.
The Language of Thought.J. A. Fodor - 1978 - Critica 10 (28):140-143.

View all 15 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Predictive Processing and the Representation Wars.Daniel Williams - 2018 - Minds and Machines 28 (1):141-172.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Norms of Intentionality: Norms That Don’T Guide.Benjamin Jarvis - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (1):1-25.
Intentionality, Content, and Primitive Mental Directedness.Richard E. Aquila - 1989 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (June):583-604.
Motor Intentionality and its Primordiality.Jennifer Hudin - 2006 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 49 (6):573 – 590.
Intentionality and Compound Accounts of the Emotions.Reid D. Blackman - 2013 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (1):67-90.
Theory of Intentionality.Ronald McIntyre & David Woodruff Smith - 1989 - In William R. McKenna & J. N. Mohanty (eds.), Husserl's Phenomenology: A Textbook. University Press of America.
What Intentionality Is Like.Keith Lehrer - 2011 - Acta Analytica 26 (1):3-14.
Cognitive Phenomenology as the Basis of Unconscious Content.Uriah Kriegel - 2011 - In T. Bayne & M. Montague (eds.), Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford University Press. pp. 79--102.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2015-07-09

Total views
35 ( #302,550 of 2,438,915 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #434,842 of 2,438,915 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes