Ultimate naturalistic casual explanations

In Ty Goldschmidt (ed.), Why is the something rather than nothing? Routledge. pp. 46-63 (2013)
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Abstract

This paper discusses attempts to explain why there are more than zero instances of the causal relation. In particular, it argues for the conclusion that theism is no better placed than naturalism to provide an "ultimate causal explanation".

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Graham Oppy
Monash University

Citations of this work

Ontological arguments.Graham Oppy - 2014 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
“Uncaused Beginnings” Revisited.Graham Oppy - 2015 - Faith and Philosophy 32 (2):205-210.
From a Necessary Being to a Perfect Being: A Reply to Byerly.Tina Anderson - 2022 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 14 (1):257-268.

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