Vague Objects within Classical Logic and Standard Mereology, and without Indeterminate Identity

Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (4):457-465 (2017)
Elisa Paganini
Università degli Studi di Milano
Weatherson argues that whoever accepts classical logic, standard mereology and the difference between vague objects and any others, should conclude that there are no vague objects. Barnes and Williams claim that a supporter of vague objects who accepts classical logic and standard mereology should recognize that the existence of vague objects implies indeterminate identity. Even though it is not clearly stated, they all seem to be committed to the assumption that reality is ultimately constituted by mereological atoms. This assumption is not granted by standard mereology which instead remains silent on whether reality is atomic or gunky; therefore, I contend that whoever maintains classical logic, standard mereology and the difference between vague objects and any others, is not forced to conclude with Weatherson that there are no vague objects; nor is she compelled to revise her point of view according to Barnes and Williams’s proposal and to accept that the existence of vague objects implies indeterminate identity.
Keywords Vague objects  Mereology  Determinate/indeterminate identity  Classical logic  Brian Weatherson  Elizabeth Barnes  J.R.G. Williams
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DOI 10.1007/s10992-016-9407-9
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