Authors
Seungbae Park
Ulsan National Institute Of Science And Technology
Abstract
Surrealism holds that observables behave as if T were true, whereas scientific realism holds that T is true. Surrealism and scientific realism give different explanations of why T is empirically adequate. According to surrealism, T is empirically adequate because observables behave as if it were true. According to scientific realism, T is empirically adequate because it is true. I argue that the surrealist explanation merely clarifies the concept of empirical adequacy, whereas the realist explanation makes an inductive inference about T. Therefore, the surrealist explanation is a conceptual one, whereas the realist explanation is an empirical one, and the former is not an alternative to the latter.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy of Mind
Categories No categories specified
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Reprint years 2019
ISBN(s) 2069-0533
DOI 10.5840/logos-episteme201910435
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