Filozofia 76 (8):581-595 (2021)

Authors
Seungbae Park
Ulsan National Institute Of Science And Technology
Abstract
Pessimists predict that future scientific theories will replace present scientific theories. However, they do not specify when the predicted events will take place, so we do not have the chance to blame them for having made a false prediction, although we might have the chance to praise them for having made a true prediction. Their predictions contrast with astronomers’ predictions. Astronomers specify when the next solar eclipse will happen, so we have both the chance to blame them for having made a false prediction and the chance to praise them for having made a true prediction. The pessimists’ prediction remains unvirtuous until they specify when scientific revolutions will occur. This critical point applies no less to the selectivist’s prediction.
Keywords Pessimistic Induction, Prediction, Scientific Realism, Scientific Revolution
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