Abstract

In this paper I will discuss the Pessimistic Meta-Induction put forth by Larry Laudan in his paper A Confutation of Convergent Realism and discuss how it overcomes the No Miracles argument for scientific realism. I will then reconcile these two positions through the theory that scientific terms posit and refer to models of reality that are relevantly similar to how the world is. This paper will begin with a discussion of the No Miracles argument and Pessimistic Meta-Induction, resulting in doubt that scientific terms genuinely refer to objects in the world. In order to overcome the anti-realist position that the Pessimistic Meta-Induction has resulted in, I will then put forth a form of realism that does not rely on the genuine reference of terms. This being that scientific terms refer to models and structures that are relevantly similar to objects in reality. This will be done with a brief discussion in the history of science, particularly with a discussion of the caloric fluid theory of heat and the evolution of the theory of light, first as a wave in either, then as a wave in space, and finally as a ‘wavicle’. This will result in the aforementioned position that retains a form of realism, but is still able to overcome the Pessimistic Meta-Induction.