Abstract

The primary aim of this dissertation is to answer the question, "What is Brentano's theory of value?", and to examine in detail some of the major theses of his theory. I concentrate on an analysis of the foundations of Brentano's ethics and investigate the process of reasoning by which he moved from his basic assumptions to his overall system of value. ;In the first chapter I attempt to clarify some of the metaphysical and epistemological presuppositions which led Brentano to regard the bearers of value, those things which are regarded as intrinsically good or intrinsically evil, as "accidents" rather than states of affairs. Therefore, the first chapter is largely explicative, with an elucidation of the connection between Brentano's ethical views and his metaphysical and epistemological views. ;The second chapter traces the development of Brentano's theory of value in relation to the principles set forth in the first chapter. ;The third and fourth chapters are devoted to a discussion of the quantitative and qualitative dimensions of pleasure and displeasure and how these function in determining the intrinsic value of wholes involving these emotions. Brentano distinguishes between two types of pleasure and displeasure--sensory pleasure and displeasure, and what we might call intentional pleasure and displeasure. The third chapter involves a discussion of the relationship Brentano believes to exist between these two types of pleasure and displeasure, and the consequences of this view for determining the intensity and quality of pleasures and displeasures. The fourth chapter is a continuation of the discussion of the quality of emotions and involves a further consideration of whether Brentano ought to be regarded as accepting G. E. Moore's principle of organic unities. ;I conclude that though not every feature of Brentano's theory is without error, his general approach to questions in the area of value theory and the logic of emotions is correct