Two arguments against disquotationalism

Dialectica 56 (2):99–108 (2002)

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Abstract
Attempts to argue that the disquotational theory of truth is somehow self‐refuting have appeared largely unchallenged in the literature for some time now. Focusing on presentations by Anil Gupta and Crispin Wright, I contend that such arguments only undermine a view that nobody endorses. This done, I explain why it is fruitless to focus, as these arguments do, on deflationary accounts of the expressive function of the truth‐predicate. I then suggest a strategy for arguing against disquotationalism and other forms of deflationism that focuses rather on the explanatory role of truth in accounts of meaning, in particular on the way that the theories of meaning compatible with deflationism handle embedded uses of sentences
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DOI 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2002.tb00233.x
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References found in this work BETA

Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Harvard University Press.
Philosophy of Logic.W. V. O. Quine - 1970 - Harvard University Press.
The Seas of Language.Michael Dummett - 1993 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Quine and the Problem of Truth.Joshua Schwartz - 2016 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 4 (10).

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