According to Davidson, his Principle of the Anomalism of the Mental, which states that there are no strict laws on the basis of which mental events can be predicted or explained, supports the claim that psychology is anomalous among the sciences. The paper argues that this latter claim is based on a conception of psychological explanation as the subsumption of behavioral events under laws, and presents an alternative conception of psychological explanation as the analysis of cognitive capacities
Keywords Knowledge  Psychology  Science  Davidson, D
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DOI 10.1093/aristotelian/96.1.37
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Actions, Reasons and Narratives.Thomas Uebel - 2012 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 55 (1):82 - 101.

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