A Priori Principles and Action-Explanation

Analysis 46 (1):39 - 45 (1986)
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Abstract

This paper is a defence of the view that action explanation deploys (relatively) a priori principles. The argument is that this is so because action explanation succeeds, Not just through revealing regularity, But through exhibiting the presence of an expected and privileged pattern. Its job is to 'normalise' action, Not just 'regularise' it

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Philip Pettit
Australian National University

Citations of this work

Between epistemology and hermeneutics.Dimitri Ginev - 1995 - Science & Education 4 (2):147-159.
Beyond the normalizing explanation.Dimitri Ginev - 1994 - Philosophia 23 (1-4):145-156.
Towards interpretation.Philip Pettit - 1994 - Philosophia 23 (1-4):157-170.

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