Quine's 'Limits of Decision'

Journal of Symbolic Logic 64 (4):1439-1466 (1999)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In a 1969 paper, Quine coined the term 'limits of decision'. This term evidently refers to limits on the logical vocabulary of a logic, beyond which satisfiability is no longer decidable. In the same paper. Quine showed that not only monadic formulas, but homogeneous k-adic formulas for arbitrary k lie on the decidable side of the limits of decision. But the precise location of the limits of decision has remained an open question. The present paper answers that question. It addresses the question of decidability of those sublogics of first-order logic that are defined in terms of their logical vocabularies. A complete answer is obtained, thus locating exactly Quine's limits of decision.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,672

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Quine's 'limits of decision'.William C. Purdy - 1999 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 64 (4):1439-1466.
Fluted formulas and the limits of decidability.William C. Purdy - 1996 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 61 (2):608-620.
What is Quine's view of truth?Donald Davidson - 1994 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 37 (4):437 – 440.
Decidability of Fluted Logic with Identity.William C. Purdy - 1996 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 37 (1):84-104.
Quine and logical truth.T. Parent - 2008 - Erkenntnis 68 (1):103 - 112.
Introduction.Paul Weirich - 2010 - Synthese 176 (1):1-3.
The limits of logical empiricism: selected papers of Arthur Pap.Arthur Pap - 2006 - Dordrecht: Springer. Edited by Alfons Keupink & Sanford Shieh.
Quine and the Problem of Truth.Joshua Schwartz - 2016 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 4 (10).
Inception of Quine's ontology.Lieven Decock - 2004 - History and Philosophy of Logic 25 (2):111-129.
Can First-Order Logical Truth be Defined in Purely Extensional Terms?Gary Ebbs - 2014 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22 (2):343-367.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-02-21

Downloads
5 (#1,535,575)

6 months
5 (#626,659)

Historical graph of downloads

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references