Cuadernos Sobre Vico 23 (24):2010 (2009)

Abstract
¿Fue realmente la necesidad de responder a los retos del escepticismo –y, en concreto, del escepticismo de Montaigne– lo que incitó a Descartes a formular el argumento del cogito? Este artículo defiende una respuesta negativa, pues no fue la herencia del escepticismo sino la del estoicismo clásico, también revitalizado en el Renacimiento, lo que fue determinante en el surgimiento del internalismo epistémico moderno.Palabras claves: Montaigne, Descartes, Epicteto, escepticismo, estocismo, internalismo epistémico moderno.Was Descartes’ Cogito argument an answer to the challenges of Scepticism and, in particular, to Montaigne’s version of it? This paper claims that the answer to this question should be negative, since it was not the influence of Scepticism, but the one of classic Stoicism –a trend that was also retrieved in the Renaissance– the one that had the main role in the rise of modern epistemic internalism.Keywords: Montaigne, Descartes, Epictetus, Scepticism, Stoicism, modern epistemic internalism
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