Immediate Knowledge: The New Dialectic of Givenness

In Thinking about knowing. New York: Oxford University Press (2002)
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Abstract

Discusses epistemic foundationalism. Examines the confrontation between Wilfrid Sellars's critique of the ‘Myth of the Given’ and William Alston's defence of ‘immediate knowledge’, and explores and endorses Sellars's strong epistemic internalism and the integrated normative accounts of justification, language‐mastery, concept‐possession, and perceptual experience that support it. The proceduralist thesis that the activity of justifying is prior to the state of being justified is elucidated and defended.

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Citations of this work

How We Know What We Think.Quassim Cassam - 2011 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 72 (4):553-569.
Still Mythic After All Those Years: On Alston's Latest Defense of the Given.Jay F. Rosenberg - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1):157-173.

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