Abstract

In his early works, Habermas wants to preserve both, the German idealist notion which gives primacy to self-reflection in the history of the human species, and the Marxist materialist conception that self-reflection is based on the material conditions of existence. ;Such dual preservation cannot be maintained; for the primacy given to self-reflection by German idealism is based on a prior spiritualization of the conditions of reflection. It is precisely with those alienated conditions that Habermas's "neo-Marxism" seeks to limit "materialistically" critical self-reflection. This is a bad overcoming of Hegel, since it preserves the Spirit as alienated otherness. ;However, Habermas's more recent linguistic turn evinces an attempt to ground critical self-reflection by means of a de-historicized anticipation of an ideal speech situation through the formal rules of cogency of speech. ;An atheistic reading of Hegel's conception of life, which regards universal life as "congealed space" or pure positivity, allows for a transition to Marx's practical communism. ;The existential attitudes towards death have as their ontological correlate, the motion of life; that is, historical acts may be regarded as attempts to appropriate objectivity which, as pure positivity, cannot be appropriated in principle, especially after the notion of an all-encompassing transcendental subjectivity, which posits the object as alienated subject, has been rejected. ;In the early Marx, historical and social investigations were limited by the primacy of the subject, the object being subordinated to it. To this extent, he naively remained at the level of ideology, i.e., "lived relations." In this manner, the unconditioned supersensible, in the form of a transcendental subjectivity, clouds the examination of the objective conditions of existence. ;The mature Marx's turn to the object expresses the elimination of the unconditioned, and the concomitant consideration of social reality as the basis of positive and negative ideologies, to the extent that the consciousness of freedom arose from the forced emancipation of consciousness from and by material conditions