Indeterminacy and Triviality

Australasian Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
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Suppose that you're certain that a certain sentence, e.g. "Frida is tall", lacks a determinate truth value. What cognitive attitude should you take towards it—reject it, suspend judgment, or what else? We show that, by adopting a seemingly plausible principle connecting credence in A and Determinately A, we can prove a very implausible answer to this question: i.e., all indeterminate claims should be assigned credence zero. The result is striking similar to so-called triviality results in the literature on modals and conditionals.



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Author Profiles

Paolo Santorio
University of Maryland, College Park
Robert Williams
University of Leeds

Citations of this work

Trivializing Informational Consequence.Paolo Santorio - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (2):297-320.
Solving the Problem of Logical Omniscience.Sinan Dogramaci - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):107-128.

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