Abstract

The primary thesis of this dissertation is that foreknowledge is incompatible with freedom, where freedom is understood in what many writers call the libertarian sense Utilizing a version of the Correspondence Theory of Truth and putting the case in terms of propositional knowledge, I argue that if p is foreknown, then p is true , and if p is true, then the corresponding future state of affairs obtains. Whether this is taken to imply that the future state of affairs already exists, or merely that the future state of affairs is determinate, we are left with the result that the future described by a true proposition is necessary in a sense which precludes libertarian freedom. ;I take it for granted that people are sometimes morally responsible for their actions, and argue that moral responsibility requires freedom. Based upon my incompatibility thesis , I deny that there can be foreknowledge of future free actions, and that propositions describing future free actions have present truth values. I link these points with agent causation, and defend the coherence of agent causation theory as espoused by such writers as Chisholm and C. A. Campbell. ;I also argue that the approach to the foreknowledge and freedom question taken by Nelson Pike and others, where the focus is on the alleged necessity of God's past beliefs concerning future occurrences, is not the most productive way to deal with the topic. Rather the focus needs to be on foreknowledge. ;In the final sections I explore some of the implications of my major theses for the providential governance of the universe by God, prophecy, the Problem of Evil, and predestination