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Summary The central issue in the free will debate is whether freedom is compatible with causal determinism. Closely parallel issues are raised by considering God's foreknowledge. God is usually held to be omniscient, and His omniscience extends to knowing how agents will act in future. The problem of freedom and foreknowledge is the problem of reconciling our freedom to act with the claim that God knows how we will act prior to our acting. If God knows how I will act before I will, it appears that I must act in the way God predicts and therefore lack the freedom to do otherwise.
Key works The problem of freedom and foreknowledge was and remains central to the philosophy of religion, beginning in the 6th century with Boethius 1962, who argued that God was outside of time and therefore it is false that God's knowledge of how I will act precedes my acting.Ockham 1983 distinguished between hard and soft facts, where hard facts alone are entirely about the past. Since God's foreknowledge consists of soft facts which is supposed to undermine its having a kind of necessity that threatens free will. The Molinist solution - Molina 1988 - turns on the claim that foreknowledge is "middle knowledge", consisting of a set of counterfactuals concerning how every free being would act in particular circumstances.
Introductions Zagzebski 1997
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235 found
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  1. added 2018-10-29
    Causality and Becoming: Scotistic Reflections.Liran Shia Gordon - 2019 - Heythrop Journal 60 (1):95-110.
    Becoming is a process in which a thing moves from one state to another. In Section 1, the study will elaborate on the discussion of the Aristotelian causes taken broadly, primarily focusing on the relation between efficient and final causes. In Section 2, the study discusses the implications of Scotus’s conception of freedom, as it is reflected in the relation of the future to the past, for the efficient and final causalities. Similarly in Section 3 an examination of Scotus’s conception (...)
  2. added 2018-10-14
    Divine Foreknowledge, Rational Determinism, and the Value of Freedom.Andrea Guardo - manuscript
    After having given in the Essay a definition of freedom which straightforwardly entails its compatibility with – among other things – God's foreknowledge, Locke surprisingly writes in a 1693 letter to Molyneux that he does not see how human liberty can coexist with divine prescience. I argue that the confession to Molyneux can be made consistent with the Essay's definition by embracing the view that the problem Locke had in mind when he drafted it was not a problem concerning the (...)
  3. added 2018-08-20
    Free Will, Foreknowledge, and Future‐Dependent Beliefs.Raphael van Riel - 2017 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 55 (4):500-520.
    Recently, a time-honored assumption has resurfaced in some parts of the free will debate: if past divine beliefs or past truths about what we do depend on what we do, then these beliefs and truths are, in a sense, up to us; hence, we are able to act otherwise, despite the existence of past truths or past divine beliefs about our future actions. In this paper, I introduce and discuss a novel incompatibilist argument that rests on. This argument is interesting (...)
  4. added 2018-08-20
    Omniscience, Free Will, and Religious Belief.Emmanuel Nartey - 2016 - Forum Philosophicum: International Journal for Philosophy 21 (2):135-155.
    In this paper, I examine a standard foreknowledge argument and some interesting ways of handling it, along with some criticisms. I argue that there are philosophically interesting notions of free will that are compatible with determinism. These are the notions of free will that matter to ordinary life, and I argue that these generate a way for a philosophically interesting understanding of free will to be compatible with belief in God’s infallible foreknowledge. I discuss two key questions—the empirical question and (...)
  5. added 2018-02-18
    Free Will: Critical Concepts in Philosophy.John Martin Fischer (ed.) - 2005 - Routledge.
    Over the last three decades there has been a tremendous amount of philosophical work in the Anglo-American tradition on the cluster of topics pertaining to Free Will. Contemporary work has in some instances been in the form of lively debates between proponents of different viewpoints, and literature surrounding the area is therefore characterized by a genuine vitality. This collection selects the very best of this material and presents it in a single, accessible set of volumes.
  6. added 2018-02-17
    A New Foreknowledge Dilemma.Linda Zagzebski - 1989 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 63:139.
  7. added 2017-11-28
    An Anti-Molinist Argument.Kenneth J. Perszyk - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 90 (3):215-235.
  8. added 2017-10-17
    Hugh J. McCann (Ed.), Free Will and Classical Theism: The Significance of Freedom in Perfect Being Theology. [REVIEW]Garrett Pendergraft - 2017 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 16.
    This volume collects a set of papers that were presented at a conference on “Big Questions in Free Will,” held at the University of Saint Thomas in October of 2014. It is dedicated to its editor, who passed away shortly after completing the manuscript. I will briefly summarize each of the 11 chapters and then offer a few critical comments.
  9. added 2017-07-29
    Introduction to Free Will and Theism.Kevin Timpe & Daniel Speak - 2016 - In Kevin Timpe & Daniel Speak (eds.), Free Will and Theism: Connections, Contingencies, and Concerns. Oxford University Press. pp. 1-26.
    Concerns both about the nature of free will and about the credibility of theistic belief and commitment have long preoccupied philosophers. This is just to make the obvious point that philosophical questions about whether we enjoy free will and about whether God exists are truly perennial. In addition, there can be no denying that the history of philosophical inquiry into these two questions has been dynamic and, at least to some degree, integrated. In a great many cases, classical answers to (...)
  10. added 2017-06-12
    Able to Do the Impossible.Jack Spencer - 2017 - Mind 126 (502):466-497.
    According to a widely held principle—the poss-ability principle—an agent, S, is able to only if it is metaphysically possible for S to. I argue against the poss-ability principle by developing a novel class of counterexamples. I then argue that the consequences of rejecting the poss-ability principle are interesting and far-reaching.
  11. added 2017-04-13
    The Open Future, Free Will and Divine Assurance: Responding to Three Common Objections to the Open View.Gregory Boyd - 2015 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 7 (3):207--222.
    In this essay I respond to three of the most forceful objections to the open view of the future. It is argued that a) open view advocates must deny bivalence; b) the open view offers no theodicy advantages over classical theism; and c) the open view can’t assure believers that God can work all things to the better. I argue that the first objection is premised on an inadequate assessment of future tensed propositions, the second is rooted in an inadequate (...)
  12. added 2017-04-05
    Fischer's Fate With Fatalism.Christoph Jäger - forthcoming - European Journal for the Philosophy of Religion 9 (2017).
    John Martin Fischer’s core project in Our Fate (2016) is to develop and defend Pike-style arguments for theological incompatibilism, i. e., for the view that divine omniscience is incompatible with human free will. Against Ockhamist attacks on such arguments, Fischer maintains that divine forebeliefs constitute so-called hard facts about the times at which they occur, or at least facts with hard ‘kernel elements’. I reconstruct Fischer’s argument and outline its structural analogies with an argument for logical fatalism. I then point (...)
  13. added 2017-02-14
    Divine and Human Knowledge in the Plotiniana Arabica».Crjstina D'’Ancona - 1997 - In John J. Cleary (ed.), The Perennial Tradition of Neoplatonism. Leuven University Press.
  14. added 2017-02-14
    Aufredo Gonteri Brito Secundum Henry of Harclay on Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents.Christopher Schabel - 1997 - Disputatio 2:157-176.
  15. added 2017-02-13
    Boethius on the Compatibility of Divine Foreknowledge and the Future of Contingent Events.M. Vesel - 2001 - Filozofski Vestnik 22 (1):7-31.
  16. added 2017-02-11
    Foreknowledge, Frankfurt, and Ability to Do Otherwise.Kadri Vihvelin - 2008 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (3):343-371.
  17. added 2017-02-11
    Power Over the Past.John Martin Fischer - 1984 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 65 (4):335.
    I distinguish two versions of the "basic" argument for the incompatibility of god's foreknowledge and human freedom to do otherwise. I discuss various examples which purport to show that the first version is unsound. These examples seem to be cases in which an agent can do something, And if he were to do that thing, The past would have been different from what it actually was. I argue that these examples apply only to the first, And not to the second (...)
  18. added 2017-02-09
    God's Justified Knowledge and the Hard-Soft Fact Distinction.John R. Shook - 2006 - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 8:69-73.
    The distinction between hard and soft facts has been used by compatibilists to argue that God's divine foreknowledge is not incompatible with human free will. The debate over this distinction has ignored the question of the justification of divine knowledge. I argue that the distinction between hard and soft facts is illusory because the existence of soft facts presupposes that justification exists. Moreover, if the hard fact /soft fact distinction collapses, then God justifiably knows all future events, and human beings (...)
  19. added 2017-02-08
    Troubles with Ockhamism.David Widerker - 1990 - Journal of Philosophy 87:462-480.
  20. added 2017-01-28
    The Beautiful Mind: A Reaffirmation and Reconstruction of the Classical Reformed Doctrines of the Divine Omniscience, Prescience, and Human Freedom.Travis J. Campbell - 2004 - Dissertation, Westminster Theological Seminary
    This dissertation explores the various conceptions of divine omniscience and their relationship to human freedom. Chapters 1--3 explore the various biblical, theological, and philosophical arguments offered by so-called open theists to show that the biblical God lacks an exhaustive foreknowledge of future contingencies. Each argument analyzed in these chapters is shown to be fallacious. Chapters 4--5 offer biblical, theological, and philosophical arguments suggesting that the God of biblical theism does, in fact, possess an exhaustive knowledge of the future. In chapter (...)
  21. added 2017-01-28
    Boethius and Others on Divine Foreknowledge.Martin Davies - 1983 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (4):313.
  22. added 2017-01-27
    Human and Divine Freedom in the Theology of Bernard of Clairvaux: A Systematic Analysis.Nico den Bok - 1993 - Bijdragen 54 (3):271-295.
  23. added 2017-01-23
    Freewill and Omniscience: A Reply to Garrett.S. McCall - 2013 - Analysis 73 (3):488-488.
    Brian Garrett (Analysis (2012), 293–5) comments on McCall's paper (Analysis (2011), 501–6). McCall had claimed that since the truth of true empirical propositions supervenes on, and depends upon, empirical fact, what God knows and does not know also depends upon being, i.e. upon facts. Consequently God's foreknowing what I freely decide to do depends upon what I freely do. Garrett objects that the dependence of truth on being seems to play no essential role in McCall's argument. McCall replies that his (...)
  24. added 2017-01-22
    Foreknowledge and Freedom.Trenton Merricks - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (4):567-586.
    The bulk of the essay “Truth and Freedom” (Philosophical Review 118 [2009]: 29–57) opposes fatalism, which is the claim that if there is a true proposition to the effect that an action A will occur, then A will not be free. But that essay also offers a new way to reconcile divine foreknowledge and human freedom. In “The Truth about Freedom: A Reply to Merricks” (Philosophical Review 120 [2011]: 97–115), John Martin Fischer and Patrick Todd raise a number of objections (...)
  25. added 2017-01-22
    Human Freedom and God's Foreknowledge.James Stacey Taylor - 2001 - Philo 4 (1):97-104.
  26. added 2017-01-22
    The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge.Richard L. Purtill - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (1):239-241.
  27. added 2017-01-22
    Omniscience, Foreknowledge and Human Freedom.Osmond G. Ramberan - 1985 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 15 (3):483 - 488.
  28. added 2017-01-22
    Pike and Hoffman on Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom.Wesley Morriston - 1982 - Philosophy Research Archives 8:521-529.
    In an article published several years ago, Nelson Pike recast his well known argument for the incompatibility of divine omniscience and human freedom in terms of a “possible worlds” analysis of human power. In this version, the argument is based on the assumption that past circumstances in the actual world “help to determine present powers.” If I am able to do something at the present time, Pike claims, there must be a possible world with a past just like the past (...)
  29. added 2017-01-22
    Foreknowledge and the Necessity of the Past.Dennis C. Holt - 1976 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 6 (4):721 - 730.
  30. added 2017-01-22
    Foreknowledge and Possibility.Paul Helm - 1976 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 6 (4):731 - 734.
  31. added 2017-01-22
    Divine Foreknowledge and Facts.Paul Helm - 1974 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):305 - 315.
  32. added 2017-01-22
    Deliberation and Foreknowledge.Richard Taylor - 1964 - American Philosophical Quarterly 1 (1):73 - 80.
  33. added 2017-01-22
    Foreknowledge and Decisions in Advance.I. Thalberg - 1964 - Analysis 24 (3):49 - 54.
  34. added 2017-01-22
    The Philosophical Implications of Foreknowledge.C. D. Broad - 1937 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 16 (1):177 - 209.
  35. added 2017-01-21
    ``Foreknowledge and Human Freedom".Linda Zagzebski - 1997 - In Philip Quinn & Charles Taliaferro (eds.), A Companion to Philosophy of Religion. Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 291-299.
  36. added 2017-01-21
    Book Review:The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge. Linda Zagzebski. [REVIEW]Brian Leftow - 1992 - Ethics 103 (1):163-.
  37. added 2017-01-21
    The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge.Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski - 1991 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    A compelling contribution to the field, The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge will appeal to students and scholars of theistic philosophy and the philosophy ...
  38. added 2017-01-21
    God, Freedom, and Foreknowledge.John Martin Fischer (ed.) - 1989 - Stanford, Ca: Stanford University Press.
  39. added 2017-01-21
    A Fable of Foreknowledge and Freedom.Jerry L. Walls - 1987 - Philosophy 62 (239):67 - 75.
  40. added 2017-01-21
    ``Freedom and Foreknowledge&Quot.John Martin Fischer - 1983 - Philosophical Review 92:67-79.
  41. added 2017-01-21
    The Necessity of Foreknowledge.David M. Rosenthal - 1976 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 1 (1):22-25.
  42. added 2017-01-21
    On Foreknowledge and Necessity.Edward Langerak - 1976 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 1 (1):12-16.
  43. added 2017-01-21
    The Paradox of Foreknowledge.Storrs McCall - 1967 - Dialogue 6 (2):229-230.
  44. added 2017-01-20
    Ambiguities of Scriptural Exegesis: Joseph Ibn Kaspi on God's Foreknowledge.Charles H. Manekin - 2008 - In Charles Harry Manekin & Robert Eisen (eds.), Philosophers and the Jewish Bible. University Press of Maryland.
  45. added 2017-01-19
    Timelessness and Foreknowledge.Brian Leftow - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 63 (3):309 - 325.
  46. added 2017-01-19
    Divine Omniscience and the Best of All Possible Worlds.David Basinger - 1982 - Journal of Value Inquiry 16 (2):143-148.
  47. added 2017-01-18
    Divine Foreknowledge – so What?Deane-Peter Baker - 2005 - Heythrop Journal 46 (1):60–65.
  48. added 2017-01-18
    Divine Foreknowledge and Newcomb's Paradox.William Lane Craig - 1987 - Philosophia 17 (3):331-350.
    Newcomb's Paradox thus serves as an illustrative vindication of the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom. A proper understanding of the counterfactual conditionals involved enables us to see that the pastness of God's knowledge serves neither to make God's beliefs counterfactually closed nor to rob us of genuine freedom. It is evident that our decisions determine God's past beliefs about those decisions and do so without invoking an objectionable backward causation. It is also clear that in the context of (...)
  49. added 2017-01-18
    Pike on Possible Worlds, Divine Foreknowledge, and Human Freedom.Joshua Hoffman - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (3):433-442.
  50. added 2017-01-18
    A Rejoinder to O'Connor.Lawrence C. Becker - 1975 - Mind 84 (333):95.
    Continuation of the discussion of the author's paper "Foreknowledge and Predestination." Mind 81 (1972): 138-41.
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