Difficulties in the theory of personal probability

Philosophy of Science 34 (4):305-310 (1967)
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Abstract

We statisticians, with our specific concern for uncertainty, are even more liable than other practical men to encounter philosophy, whether we like it or not. For my part, I like it comparatively well. That is why the honor of opening this session of discussion has come to me, though my background makes my knowledge and idiom somewhat different from your own.

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References found in this work

Implications of personal probability for induction.Leonard J. Savage - 1967 - Journal of Philosophy 64 (19):593-607.

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