Abstract

The distinction between sense perception and reflective perception that is made in Leibniz's theory of perception is then considered in relation to his theory of the knowledge of truth. There he makes a parallel distinction between the knowledge of truths of fact and the knowledge of truths of reason. These two kinds of knowledge are considered both separately and in relation to one another. Finally, there is a consideration of the way in which Leibniz synthesizes experience and reason in his accounts of natural science and of jurisprudence as examples of actual human knowledge. It is argued that the Leibnizian synthesis of experience and reason is an attempt to overcome the weaknesses that he perceived in the Cartesian and Lockean approaches to knowledge. ;Natural perception and the theory of unconscious "little perceptions" are considered in the context of Leibniz's metaphysics and of the degrees of clarity and distinctness that characterizes the levels of perception. Sense perception is considered in the context of his account of the relation between the body and the soul and of his definition of sense perception as perception that is relatively distinct and accompanied by memory. Reflective perception is considered in the context of Leibniz's defense of innate ideas and of his notion of apperception as the perception of perception. ;This dissertation is concerned with an investigation of the relation between experience and reason in Gottfried Leibniz's theory of knowledge. This investigation is occasioned by the need to consider Leibniz's account of truth from an epistemological perspective as well as from the logical and metaphysical perspectives that have claimed the attention of most recent studies of Leibniz's thought. ;Leibniz's theory of perception is taken as the link between his logic and metaphysics on the one hand and his epistemology on the other. His definition of perception as the expression of the many in the one is closely connected with his concept of substance as a unit of activity. Leibniz uses the term "perception" not only in a narrow cognitive sense but in a broader metaphysical sense as a generic term for monadic activity. He distinguishes three levels of perception: natural perception, sense perception, and reflective perception