Abstract

An important problem of perception is to explain the relation between perception and knowledge. My thesis represents an ambitious attempt to reassess this problem systematically, to apply some recent philosophical developments in theory of perception, and to propose a solution which synthesizes my results and contributes toward a revitalization of theory of knowledge. ;I begin by distinguishing two major but divergent approaches in the philosophy of perception--the logical theory and the causal theory. According to the first, the problem of perception is to give an account of the epistemological or justificatory relationship between sensory experience and our beliefs about the physical world. According to the second, the problem of perception is to give an account of the causal relationship between sensory experience and the physical world, and of the causal conditions of the acquisition of beliefs about the physical world by means of the senses. ;I argue that the reconciliation of these accounts is the central issue in contemporary philosophy of perception, and that a synthesis of the two theories will permit the resolution of some key problems concerning the relation between perception and knowledge. ;I begin the work with a discussion of the ways in which the logical theory and the causal theory are antagonistic toward one another as solutions to the problem of perception, and how various philosophical positions may be taken with respect to the relation between perception and knowledge. Next, I examine some of the central themes of the logical theory and its appeal to criteria, meaning, and rules of language. My own theory about the problem of perception begins in the chapter in which I focus on issues concerning the relations amongst sensory experience, beliefs, and evidence. A synthesis of the logical and causal theories begins to emerge in the chapter on perception and causation, in which I defend a causal theory of perception and argue that some key epistemological principles are explained by reference to causation. Finally, I consider the philosophical issues involved in fully synthesizing the two approaches in theory of perception, after which I propose an account of the relation between perception and belief in which sensory experiences are both reasons for and causes of perceptual beliefs