Psychology and epistemology of (belief, assent) according to Hume

Dialectica 47 (2-3):255-267 (1993)
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Abstract

In his treatise, Hume wanted, at first, to release a purely psychological and naturalistic conception of belief, and thus to exclude evaluation by a normative epistemology. In a second time, however, he reintroduced an original epistemological dimension, thereby departing from his initial psychological program.

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Daniel Schulthess
Université de Neuchâtel

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