Topoi 31 (1):77-85 (2012)

Abstract
From the point of view of proof-theoretic semantics, it is argued that the sequent calculus with introduction rules on the assertion and on the assumption side represents deductive reasoning more appropriately than natural deduction. In taking consequence to be conceptually prior to truth, it can cope with non-well-founded phenomena such as contradictory reasoning. The fact that, in its typed variant, the sequent calculus has an explicit and separable substitution schema in form of the cut rule, is seen as a crucial advantage over natural deduction, where substitution is built into the general framework.
Keywords Proof-theoretic semantics  Paradoxes  Sequent calculus  Natural deduction  Cut rule
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11245-012-9119-x
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 60,949
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Logical Basis of Metaphysics.Michael DUMMETT - 1991 - Harvard University Press.
Proof-Theoretic Semantics.Peter Schroeder-Heister - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

View all 10 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Logical Consequence and the Paradoxes.Edwin Mares & Francesco Paoli - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (2-3):439-469.
Ekman’s Paradox.Peter Schroeder-Heister & Luca Tranchini - 2017 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 58 (4):567-581.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2012-03-31

Total views
73 ( #143,057 of 2,439,384 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
5 ( #136,869 of 2,439,384 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes